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Abstract: 
This paper examines the role of social conflict in explaining macroeconomic phenomena and, 
especially, the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies as a means of raising real output. The 
social conflict approach to macroeconomic phenomena is compared with a Keynesian view 
along with Ball, Mankiw and Romer’s (1988) and Lucas’ (1973) models of the determinants of 
the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies (or the slope of the Phillips curve). Empirical 
analysis over the period from the 1950s to the 1990s for 15 OECD countries provides 
significant evidence that the social conflict view of inflation has much to offer in explaining 
differences in the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies both across countries and through 
time. 
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Social Conflict and Macroeconomics 
what determines the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies? 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In the 1970s and 1980s, there developed in response to the worsening economic conditions of 
that time what for the sake of convenience we shall term the social conflict approach to 
macroeconomic phenomena. The contributors to this approach came from various academic 
disciplines such as political science, sociology and economics (especially economists who were 
critical of the neoclassical-Keynesian synthesis which was dominant at the time). Not 
surprisingly, given these diverse backgrounds, there were differences in focus, methodology and 
terminology, but, as we hope to show, there comes out from this work a remarkably coherent 
account of why macroeconomic imbalances were unproblematic during the 1950s and 1960s 
(that is, the period that has come to be known as the ‘golden age” of capitalism)1; why this 
ceased to be the case in the 1970s and 1980s; and the prerequisites for the restoration of 
something like the golden age. 
 
A full account of the golden age and its decline is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather our 
focus in this paper is on the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies. As we shall see in the 
next section, according to the social conflict approach, aggregate demand policy that could 
maintain output at its full employment level was one of the main pillars of the golden age and 
the increasing inability of such policy to meet this goal signalled the decline of the golden age. 
We provide in this paper an empirical test for the argument that effective aggregate demand 
policies are associated with the level of social conflict. Indeed, we show that this association is 
at least as strong if not stronger than the associations predicted by three standard economic 
theories, namely traditional Keynesianism, neo-Keynesianism and new classical theory. 
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In section II, we develop the main themes of 
the social conflict approach. In particular, we show why this approach suggests that there should 
be a strong association between the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies and profits – 
when profits and profitability are healthy, the expectation is that macroeconomic policies can 
play their role in maintaining full employment output, whereas when profits and profitability are 
low, expansionary macroeconomic policy is likely to lead to increases in prices rather than 
output. In section III, we compare this prediction with those of a basic Keynesian model, a new-
Keynesian model (Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988) and a new classical model (Lucas, 1973). 
Rather than profits, these theories suggest an association between the effectiveness of demand 
policies and capacity utilisation, the level of inflation and the variance of inflation, respectively. 
Section IV outlines our methodology for comparing the relative importance of these four 
associations predicted by the four approaches. Finally, we offer some conclusions. 
 
II. The Social Conflict Approach 
 
Two themes permeate the social conflict literature. The first is that the stability of the market 
economy is considered inherently problematic. This contrasts with both monetarist optimism 
about the inherent forces for stability within a market economy and the Keynesian relative 
optimism that such stability can be assured with appropriate government action through control 
of various macroeconomic aggregates. To take a polar opposite to these approaches, reflecting 
the tradition of sociology that has tended to emphasise the non-economic supports needed to 
make the market operate, Goldthorpe (1978, p.194) argues that the market economy itself tends 
to have a destabilising effect on society and that it is exogenous factors, some of them not part 
of the economy as such, which can hold it together, if only for a time2. Similarly for economists 
working within the regulation school3, what needs to be explained is not so much unsuccessful 
periods of economic performance in terms of exogenous shocks, policy mistakes or irrational 
behaviour on the part of economic agents but rather the various elements that have come 
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together at particular historical junctures to produce a favourable environment for the success of 
the economy. 
 
The second theme is the prevalence of conflict within market economies and the idea that 
market outcomes are not necessarily generally acceptable. The moral standing of the market has 
long been a subject of dispute. As Sen (1989) argues, a Pareto optimum competitive equilibrium 
can be of little moral worth while there is little sense in which the marginal product received by 
individuals in such equilibria represents in some way their own contribution (that is, what they 
“deserve”). Thus there is every reason to expect that individuals that are unhappy with market 
outcomes will seek to change them. Without special institutions to mediate conflict, such as we 
shall see existed with the Keynesian compromise during the golden age, the conflict between 
and within groups can lead to inflation and/or stagflation. Moreover, analysts within this social 
conflict approach do not see behaviour that leads to inflation as necessarily irrational in any 
sense. It may be better than any alternative strategy4. Moreover, if any one group knows that in 
the end conflictual behaviour may lead to higher inflation and/or higher unemployment, to stand 
back from this may entail losing out to other groups. That is to say there is a collective action 
problem associated with ‘leapfrogging’5. 
 
In order to develop the approach further, we present below a stylised account which draws on 
various disciplines which have social conflict at the core of their analysis6. The golden age of 
capitalism characterised by full-employment, rapid growth and impressive productivity 
performance was underpinned by the ‘Keynesian compromise’ where capital gave up opposition 
to collective bargaining, the welfare state and demand management in exchange for control of 
investment (Maier and Lindberg, 1985, p.594; Glyn et al, 1990). Most of the accounts of this 
compromise develop Kalecki’s (1943) insight that capitalism is incompatible with full 
employment unless there are major institutional arrangements to incorporate workers into the 
decision-making system. In more neo-classical terms, institutions, such as the welfare state and 
centralised bargaining, can been seen as helping to solve various coordination and commitment 
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problems that can arise in a market economy (Eichengreen, 1996). Such institutions 
underpinned the investment boom and high growth rates of the post-war period which in turn 
made macroeconomic policy, and in particular its ability to ensure full-employment, easier and 
the distributional struggle more manageable7. The subsequent stagflation and inflation of the 
1970s8, and beyond, are then tied to the demise of that compromise with implications, now in 
reverse, for investment and growth, and the ability of macroeconomic policy to continue to 
ensure full-employment without this leading to inflation. As Maier and Lindberg (1985, p.596) 
put it ‘the inflation problem rightly understood is the counterpart of the investment challenge.’ 
What went wrong according to this account was that the compromise increasingly failed to keep 
savings and investment at the level needed to support the continuation of the golden age. Of 
course not all economies experienced the demise of the golden age in the same way. And indeed 
in the 1970s and 1980s an influential view was that neo-corporatist economies – significantly 
for our purposes exactly those economies with sophisticated institutions to accommodate social 
conflict in the labour market – were able for a time to adjust to the new circumstances with 
fewer consequences for inflation or unemployment9, or indeed a rise in inequality10, than the 
more liberal economies. But eventually even these economies began to feel the strain. 
 
This reflects the fact that for the social conflict approach any settlement within a market 
economy is likely to be a rather fragile affair, needing from time to time renegotiation and 
institutional development. Goldthorpe’s (1978, p.196) account of the demise of the compromise, 
and the rise of stagflation, stresses the importance of changes in the form of social stratification 
of advanced capitalist economies, that is in the structures of social advantage and power and 
relates this to three developments in the post-war period: the decay of the status order, the 
realization of social citizenship and the emergence of a mature working class. An important part 
of his argument is that these factors are endogenous to a market economy. It is not that the 
market economy is a basically stable entity which is derailed from time to time by exogenous 
forces, such as trade union militancy say, but that the market itself may rely on non-market 
institutions for support. Goldthorpe’s first example is the role of social status underpinning 
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market inequalities and the way in which the ideology of status was increasingly undermined by 
the market itself11. 
 
This sociological approach was similar to the account common in political science at the time: 
[w]ith the politicization of economic life, the ability to escape the authority and 
discipline of the market, to gain control of price and income and of one’s economic 
destiny, has been generalized. Society thus must develop new arrangements for 
distributing income losses and adjusting the expectations of all groups. (Lindberg, 1985, 
p.45)12. 
 
For Maier and Lindberg (1985, p.597) the problems of the 1970s were both economic and 
political: 
[i]nflation and stagnation emerged from, and then helped intensify, a major questioning 
of the division of labour within the industrial nations and between these nations and the 
newer developing regions of the world[13]. Class and political compromises that had 
allowed a generation of post-war growth could no longer command the consensus they 
earlier had. 
 
In these accounts of the need to rework the post-war settlement, two solutions, going in 
radically different directions, were discussed. One entailed a market strategy to reduce the 
effects of politics on economic decision-making The other was a renewed attempt at 
democratization and inclusion, that is a reworking of the old Keynesian compromise. For most 
analysts within the social conflict approach, either strategy implied a political economy project 
with clear winners and losers14. This fact is often missed in much economic analysis because the 
acceptability of market outcomes is taken as given, whereas in the social conflict approach, 
market outcomes are themselves a source of conflict with the losers seeking in some sense to 
work ‘against the market’. In this light, ‘Renunciation of political weaponry is an unattractive 
option, above all for groups that look to political weapons to alter the economic and political 
status quo in their favour. (In the words of an old Labour Party slogan: ’The rich man has his 
money, the poor man has his politics’)’ (Hirsch, 1978, p.269)15.  Within this framework, 
‘[e]fforts to depoliticise the market tend to be spurious. They usually entail a one-sided 
buttressing of profits and managerial prerogatives’ (Maier and Lindberg, p.597-8)16. This clearly 
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has very different implications from a strategy of inclusion and rebuilding the Keynesian 
compromise. 
 
From the standpoint of the present it is clear that the more liberal strategy has been more 
prevalent in the period since the mid-1980s. But the analysis which emphasizes social conflict 
has lost little of its bite. It is true that for many analysts working in this tradition there was a 
belief in the superiority of the ‘democratic’ and ‘inclusive’ solution and a skepticism that a neo-
liberal approach could command long-term support17. But this should be distinguished from the 
methodological and analytic advances of the approach that are still crucial to the understanding 
of how the conflict was resolved in the more recent period. As Glyn et al (1990, p.117) predict  
as long as high unemployment rates in the advanced countries are politically acceptable, 
the balance of advantage (from the standpoint of conservative governments in the 
leading countries) lies in continuing with the current macroeconomic pattern of low 
growth and low inflation. For if expansionary policies were followed and world 
economic growth rose on a sustained basis to anywhere near its golden age level, it will 
indeed lead to an increase in the power of unions as well as a sharp rise in commodity 
prices, including oil. This in turn will rekindle a conflict over income distribution 
threatening to push up inflation. 
 
Moreover where the market strategy has been more successful it has been associated with a rise 
in profitability and inequality. The problems of unemployment have been fewer in those 
economies where market ideology has been strongest and where politicians, including those of 
the Left, have been more willing to adopt pro-market ideology – that is to say where market 
outcomes have come to be more widely accepted18. Where such outcomes are less acceptable, 
continental Europe being the prime example, the problem of inflation has been solved at the 
cost of persistently high levels of unemployment. This Hobson’s choice of low inflation either 
with increased inequality (and/or poverty) or with high unemployment hardly suggests that 
Kalecki’s dilemma has been solved by advanced capitalist economies. On the contrary it 
suggests the continuing relevance of the social conflict view of inflation and stagflation that 
came to the fore in the 1970s. 
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The main message of the above for our purposes is that, although this literature covers a wide 
range of issues associated with economic performance in the post-war period, it originated from 
the observation that macroeconomic policies became less effective as a means to stabilise the 
economy. Part of the success of the Keynesian compromise was the ability to use 
macroeconomic policy to ensure sufficient demand. This was less possible in the 1970s and 
1980s. Increases in aggregate demand were now as likely to lead to price increases as to an 
output response. For economists working in the mainstream tradition, this observation was 
explained in terms of a shifting Phillips curve because of increased inflationary expectations. 
Alternatively, they saw it as a steepening of the Phillips curve as agents became less likely to 
mistake general price increases for relative price increases or as the costs of changing prices 
were more than outweighed by the benefits. This contrasts strongly with the approach outlined 
here which associated this worsening of the overall context for economic policy-making with 
declining profits and profitability, a trend which started in the mid to late 1960s19. Thus 
profitability can be seen in this context as the initial indicator that the conditions that 
underpinned the golden age were coming under pressure. For authors working within this 
approach, the decline in profits not only had consequences for the efficacy of stabilisation 
policy over the short run, but also for investment and longer-term issues, such as productivity 
and growth. This observation leads to wider implications about the rise and decline of the 
golden age which are beyond our scope here. The focus here is on the potential effect that 
conflict and declining profitability can have on the efficacy of macroeconomic policies. 
 
III. Testing for the validity of social conflict 
 
This paper seeks to test the social conflict approach against three prominent views within 
economics of the slope of the Phillips curve (a measure of aggregate demand policy 
effectiveness), a Keynesian interpretation along with those of the new classicals (Lucas, 1973) 
and the New Keynesians (Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988). The Phillips curve shows the 
inverse relationship between inflation and unemployment. The ability of aggregate demand 
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policies to increase output (and hence reduce unemployment) is greater the flatter the Phillips 
curve; a steep Phillips curve implies that increases in aggregate demand are reflected only in 
price rises. In this section we outline the four theories and the hypotheses they generate.  
 
A basic Keynesian analysis of the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies focuses on the 
degree of capacity utilisation20. This will determine the extent to which firms are able to respond 
to increases in aggregate demand by raising output rather than prices. As the economy 
approaches full employment, so increases in aggregate demand will be less effective at raising 
output; rather prices will be increased and the Phillips curve is rather steep. Thus the prediction 
of this model is that capacity utilisation or some measure of output relative to potential output 
will be positively related to the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies. 
 
Lucas (1973), in the new classical tradition, hypothesises that the trade-off between changes in 
output (or alternatively unemployment) and inflation arises when agents observe changes in 
prices which they mistakenly perceive as changes in the price of one good relative to another 
and not changes in the absolute price level where the prices of all goods change proportionately. 
Lucas’ model creates the empirical prediction that the effectiveness of aggregate demand 
policies (or the slope of the Phillips curve) is related to the variance of inflation. If the variance 
of inflation increases, then this increases the uncertainty which agents face and they are more 
likely to attribute price movements to nominal shocks (requiring a change in the absolute price 
level) rather than real shocks (leading to changes in relative prices) and hence they will tend to 
respond by changing prices and not output. Under these circumstances, aggregate demand 
policies will be less effective. 
 
Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) provide a new-Keynesian account of the inflation-output trade-
off. Their model assumes an imperfectly competitive economy where price rigidities arise 
because individual price setters in general face only a small incentive to change their prices in 
the face of a shock. When however average inflation is high, shocks to aggregate demand will 
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be more likely reflected in changes in prices rather than output. This arises from the fact that 
when inflation is high, the benefits to the firm (in terms of remaining at its profit-maximising 
equilibrium) of changing prices more than outweigh the costs of changing prices (the so-called 
small menu costs which include the costs of reprinting catalogues, replacing price tags, etc). 
Thus their model predicts that the slope of the Phillips curve will be steeper and the trade-off 
less favourable when average inflation is higher. 
 
The latter two theories also hypothesise that the variance of nominal aggregate demand will 
influence the slope of the Phillips curve. For Lucas, a larger variance of nominal aggregate 
demand implies agents will view aggregate demand shocks as more likely to be nominal than 
real shocks and hence will respond by not changing output. Similarly Ball, Mankiw and Romer 
(1988) predict a positive relationship between the variance of nominal aggregate demand and 
the slope of the Phillips curve. However, their reasoning is rather different. The larger the 
variance of nominal demand shocks, the more costly it is for the firm to keep prices fixed since 
it is likely to move quite far away from its profit-maximising equilibrium. Thus, testing the 
relationship between the slope of the Phillips curve and the variance of aggregate demand does 
not allow us to distinguish between these two theories. 
 
We can compare the above theories with that of a social conflict view of the output-inflation 
trade-off. We rely mainly on a model of inflation developed by Rowthorn (1977) which 
provides a more specific foundation for many of the ideas discussed in the previous section. 
Rowthorn (1977) argues that inflation arises from conflict between capitalists and workers over 
the sharing out of total income generated by the economy. Both groups are essentially interested 
in maximising their share, but both face constraints in terms of the amount of power which they 
can exercise. 
 
The model assumes that workers bargain over money wages with their employers, taking into 
account that prices will rise by a given expected amount. This generates a wage share for 
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workers and hence, as a residual, the profit share. Capitalists, however, have a target profit share 
and once wages are determined through the bargaining process, they set their prices in order to 
generate a profit share as close to their target as possible21. If the profit share which emerges 
from the bargaining process with workers (the “negotiated” profit share) is equal to the target 
profit share, then capitalists will raise prices by the amount anticipated in the wage bargaining 
process and there is no conflict. Conflict arises between workers and capitalists if the negotiated 
profit share is less than the target. In this case, capitalists will seek to use what power they have 
to raise prices by more than workers’ anticipated increase and hence raise the profit share at the 
expense of the wage share. That is, they engineer a redistribution of income from wages to 
profits through generating higher than anticipated inflation. 
 
What determines the power of each party in the model? Essentially, it depends on the level of 
demand: in the case of workers, it is the demand for labour; in the case of capitalists, the 
demand for their product(s). If workers are strong because there is a scarcity of the particular 
type of labour they are offering, then they can demand large wage increases and through that 
exert considerable downward pressure on the negotiated profit share. However, if capitalists are 
strong because the demand for their product(s) is high, then they can simply raise prices in order 
to try to restore their target profit share. Thus in both cases, power and therefore conflict and 
inflation is an increasing function of demand. This model generates a Phillips curve (an inverse 
relationship between inflation and unemployment) if we assume that the level of demand in 
both labour and product markets is inversely related to unemployment22. 
 
Rowthorn’s model gives us two critical ingredients. First, the idea that capitalists have some 
kind of target for profits rather than being profit maximisers as assumed by both new classical 
and New Keynesian models. Second, if negotiated profits are lower than the target, then 
capitalists will use the power they have in product markets to raise their prices and ensure that 
the gap between negotiated and target profits is closed (at least to some extent). The extent to 
which prices will rise will depend on market power and demand conditions. 
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Our interest lies in the impact of an increase in aggregate demand on inflation and output in this 
kind of model. For Rowthorn, increases in aggregate demand will increase the power of 
capitalists to raise their prices if their negotiated profits are below the target. This generates the 
prediction that when profits are low, an expansionary aggregate demand policy is likely to be 
less effective – it will lead to inflation rather than a rise in output as capitalists seek to restore 
profits by raising prices. On the other hand, when negotiated profits are close to the target, an 
increase in aggregate demand will be more likely to lead capitalists to sell more output at 
current prices (since they are happy with the profits that emerge from their negotiations with 
workers). Thus Rowthorn’s model generates an inverse relationship between profits and the 
effectiveness of demand policies. 
 
It is interesting to ask what the implications of Rowthorn’s model are for the relationship 
between inflation and aggregate demand policies since this will allow some comparison with the 
model of Ball, Mankiw and Romer. Recall, that the latter model generates the result that the 
Phillips curve will be steep (aggregate demand policies less effective) when inflation is high and 
vice versa. Rowthorn’s model generates the same result. When profits are low, aggregate 
demand policies are ineffective and inflation will be high since conflict is high (the negotiated 
profit share is below the target share) and capitalists will raise prices as much as possible in 
order to redistribute income towards profits. By contrast, when profits are high, aggregate 
demand policies will be effective and inflation is low since conflict is low (negotiated profits are 
close to their target) and capitalists will not be raising prices to redistribute income to profits.  
 
However, the two models do not predict the same relationship between profits and the slope of 
the Phillips curve. Ball, Mankiw and Romer’s (1988) model suggests, if anything, a negative 
relationship between profitability and the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies. If firms 
do not change their prices in response to a shock to aggregate demand, then, relative to when 
they do change prices, profits will be lower as firms move away from the profit maximising 
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position. In this case, aggregate demand policies will be more effective. By contrast, when firms 
change their prices in response to shocks, profits will be relatively higher (since they will be at 
the profit-maximising position) and aggregate demand policies will have no real effects. This 
negative relationship predicted by Ball, Mankiw and Romer between profits and the 
effectiveness of aggregate demand policies is the opposite of what the social conflict approach 
predicts. 
 
So the finding that the slope of the Phillips curve is inversely related to the level of inflation 
does not allow us to distinguish between the two models. What distinguishes the models is the 
prediction about profitability: the social conflict approach is consistent with a positive 
relationship between the slope of the Phillips curve and profitability; the new-Keynesian theory 
predicts a negative relationship. 
 
IV. Methodology and empirical analysis 
 
Lucas (1973) and Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) take the following equation23: 
 lnyt = α + βlnyt-1 + γtrend + τ∆xt      (1) 
where lnyt = real income in period t 
∆xt = change in nominal income from period t-1 to t. 
τ measures the extent to which changes in nominal income (proxying aggregate demand 
policies) affect real income and hence gives us some measure of the slope of the Phillips 
curve24. If τ = 0, then aggregate demand policies have no impact on real income and the Phillips 
curve is vertical. If τ = 1, then aggregate demand policies affect only real income (and not prices 
or inflation) and hence the Phillips curve will be horizontal. For 0 < τ < 1, aggregate demand 
policies influence both output and prices and the Phillips curve will be negatively sloped. 
 
Lucas (1973) estimates τ for each of his 18 countries using data over the period 1952-67. He 
then relates the measures of τ to the variance of inflation. Argentina, the country with the lowest 
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value of τ, experienced the highest variance of inflation. By contrast, the US, with the highest τ 
had the lowest variance of inflation. Indeed, on the basis of Lucas’ results in his Table 2, the 
correlation coefficient between τ and the variance of inflation is high and negative (-0.71), 
consistent with his theory. 
 
Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) have information on 43 countries over the period 1948-86. In 
line with their theory, they examine whether a relationship exists between τ (estimated for each 
country individually, as in Lucas (1973)) and the level of inflation using scatter plots and simple 
correlations. The results indeed suggest a strong relationship which they take as evidence in 
favour of their ‘small menu costs’ theory and against that of Lucas’. They also provide cross-
sectional regression evidence of a negative relationship. 
 
Our sample of countries is limited to those for which profits data is available: Australia (AUS), 
Belgium (BE), Canada (CA), Denmark (DK) Finland (FN), France (FR), Germany (GE), Italy 
(IT), Japan (JA), the Netherlands (NL), New Zealand (NZ), Norway (NW), Sweden (SW), the 
United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US). Data on price deflators and either real GDP 
or GDP volume is taken from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. We have both profit 
rates and shares for manufacturing and business where available and these were taken from 
Armstrong et al (1987) or Glyn (1997) for the earlier period and from OECD National Accounts 
from 1970 onwards. The data period varies by country, but in general we have attempted to 
cover the period from 1950 to the mid-1990s. This gives us a much greater span of data than 
used by either Lucas (1973) or Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988). Exact details of data 
availability and the method used to calculate profit rates and shares are given in Appendix I. 
 
We proceed in our investigation of the four theories in the following manner. First, since we 
employ a different data period to Lucas (1973) and Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988), we begin 
by examining whether their results using cross-sectional data continue to hold up to the mid-to-
late 1990s25. Second we examine the relationship between τ and capacity utilisation, the 
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variability of inflation, the level of inflation and profits individually using a cross-sectional time 
series approach. Finally, we consider all four theories simultaneously and try to provide an 
assessment of the relative strength of the association predicted by each theory. 
 
Updating the results of previous theories: In order to update the results of previous work, we 
estimate τ for the longest period possible for each country and then calculate both the variance 
of inflation and average inflation over that period. In order to avoid spurious regressions, we 
rewrite equation (1) as follows (by subtracting yt-1 from both sides of equation (1))26: 
 ∆lnyt = α + δlnyt-1 + γtrend + τ∆xt      (1a) 
where δ = (β – 1). The results are reported in Table 1 and the relationship between τ and the 
variance of inflation (Lucas’ prediction) is shown in the scatter plot in Figure 1. It appears that 
the negative relationship continues to hold and the correlation coefficient is –0.63. 
 
In Figure 2, we plot average inflation against τ to examine the prediction arising from Ball, 
Mankiw and Romer’s theory. Once again the negative relationship is clear and the correlation 
coefficient is –0.73 suggesting that the relationship has not broken down in the 1990s. 
 
The importance of conflict and profitability: In part because we have fewer countries than 
Ball, Mankiw and Romer, we adopt the following strategy which allows us to go beyond simple 
correlations and scatter plots and examine the above hypotheses by using regression analysis. 
We estimate equation (1a) recursively and we keep the series of τ generated by this process27. 
 
This strategy implies we have more than one observation for τ for each country which has two 
distinct advantages. First, it allows us to examine the stability of τ over time for different 
countries. Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) provide some evidence of instability by estimating 
equation (1) for the period pre-1973 and post-1972 noting that for 63% of countries the τ is 
significantly different between these two periods. Although this suggests that the effectiveness 
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of aggregate demand policies does not just vary across countries, but also through time, they do 
not investigate this further. For taking an ‘average’ τ, that is one estimated over the whole 
sample period, effectively ignores this instability and reduces the question of the effectiveness 
of aggregate demand policies to a cross-sectional one whereas in fact it could also have a time 
dimension. That is, aggregate demand policies might not only be more effective in some 
countries than in others, but might have been more effective in some periods in a given country 
than in other periods. 
 
The second advantage of our methodology is that just as τ might differ over time for any 
country, so might the variance of inflation, the level of inflation, capacity utilisation or our 
various measures of profits. Thus it may be incorrect to classify a country as high inflation 
variability, high inflation or high profits for the whole period in question. To take the case of 
profits, a simply graph of profit rates (or share) show structural breaks in different countries, 
and hence talking about some average profit rate over the whole period is not really appropriate. 
Similar arguments can be made about capacity utilisation, inflation and the variance of inflation. 
 
The recursive estimates of τ can be seen in Figures 3-6. It is clear that there are sharp changes in 
the value of τ around the first oil price shock, although the extent to which τ changes varies 
from country to country28. In some countries (AUS, BE, DK, FR, JA, NL, UK, US), it appears 
that aggregate demand policies have become less effective in later years. In other countries the 
opposite is true. We test for structural breaks in equation (1) and the results are given in Table 2 
where we report the Chow test for a structural break in any given year29. They show that there 
are structural breaks in all countries except the Netherlands and Norway (but that is not because 
τ is stable, but just that it changes smoothly) - indeed in  some countries there are two as policy 
effectiveness changed quite a bit. So there is indeed something to explain not just cross-
sectionally between countries, but also through time for any one country. 
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Having derived a measure of τ, we then examine the relationship between the values of τ and 
various measures of profits30, capacity utilisation, inflation and the variability of inflation. To 
begin with, some descriptive correlation coefficients are given in Table 3 on a country-by-
country basis. The correlations in the last column of Table 3 show that the relationship between 
the cyclical component of income and the value of τ is mixed. We measure cyclical income as  
deviations of real GDP from its trend31. In only 9 out of 15 countries is the sign of the 
correlation coefficient as predicted by the theory (that is, negative) and in a number of cases it is 
very small. If we pool all the countries and run a fixed effects regression32, the results suggest 
that capacity utilisation is positively related to aggregate demand policy effectiveness: 
  τit, = 0.41 + 0.33ycit        (2) 
                     (0.01)  (0.17) 
 
where the number of observations is 545 and ycit is cyclical income in country i at time t. Note 
that standard errors are given in brackets below the appropriate coefficient. These results are 
contrary to what Keynesian theory would predict. 
 
A mixed picture also emerges for the relationship between the variability of inflation and the 
value of τ. Lucas (1973) simply uses the standard deviation of inflation across time in each 
country to represent inflation variability. However, this does not capture any differences in the 
variability of inflation which might occur through time in individual countries – the resulting 
standard deviation may be an average of periods of high and low variability. To overcome this, 
we measure the variability of inflation using two methods: first, a centered moving standard 
deviation over 3 periods (Klein, 1977); second, a GARCH model33 (Engle, 1982, 1983; 
Bollerslev, 1986). The latter has the advantage of being a conditional variance that can alter 
over time. It is conditional in the sense that all previously available information, including 
shocks to mean inflation, is included, something which fits nicely with new classical theory and 
its assumption of rational expectations. The results in Table 3 are for the GARCH measures of 
inflation variability and the results do not differ qualitatively from those generated using the 
moving standard deviation. For some countries there is little relationship (AUS, GE, SW, US); 
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for four countries there is a strong positive relationship (DK, FR, JA, NL); only in BE, CA, FN, 
IT, NW, NZ and UK (that is, less than half of the countries) is the relationship predicted by 
theory (that is, negative) and sometimes it is rather weak. 
 
A fixed effects regression across all countries generates a no more encouraging picture for 
Lucas’ prediction. In particular: 
τ = 0.41   -   0.02 πsd       (3) 
(0.01)     (0.62) 
 
where the number of observations is 545 and πsd is the GARCH measure of inflation variability. 
The variability of inflation across countries and across time is not significantly related to τ 
 
Table 3 also shows the correlation coefficient between τ and the level of inflation. Ball, Mankiw 
and Romer predict a negative relationship and, indeed, in 11 of our 15 countries this proves to 
be the case. Equations (4) and (5) below report regressions where τ is regressed on inflation for 
the pre-1986 period (in an attempt to mimic as far as we can the data period used by Ball, 
Mankiw and Romer) and the whole period. Again we run a fixed effects regression. The 
negative relationship shows up clearly, although it is much weaker for the period as a whole (the 
coefficient falls by almost two-thirds)34. 
  
pre-1986 τ = 0.53 - 1.41π     (4) 
(0.02)  (0.23) 
 
whole period: τ = 0.44 - 0.52π     (5) 
    (0.01)  (0.16) 
 
The social conflict approach, while also being consistent with the results in (4) and (5), predicts 
that there should be a positive relationship between profits and the effectiveness of aggregate 
demand policies. Thus we now turn to examine how τ varies with profitability. Correlation 
coefficients between τ and various measures of profits are reported in Table 3. We use both 
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profit shares and profit rates in manufacturing and business since not all series are available for 
every country. 
 
The results show that by and large, the relationship between τ and profitability is positive as 
expected. There are some exceptions, notably Germany, Denmark and New Zealand, where the 
relationship is always negative. The positive relationship is confirmed by a fixed effects 
regression, the results of which are shown in Table 4 for the whole period35. We quote results 
for each of our four profits measures. In each case, they show a strong positive relationship 
between profits and τ, with the exception of the net profit share in the business sector. The fixed 
effects are strongly significant, indicating that there are country specific effects which are not 
captured by the differences in profitability36. 
 
The four hypotheses compared: Up till now we have examined the predictions of each theory 
individually. What is also of interest is to compare the theories to determine which prediction 
has the strongest relationship with the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies. To this end, 
we use our panel of data to estimate a fixed effects regression where we include the predictions 
of all the theories37. 
 τit = αi + βπsd,it + γπit + δprofitit + µycit      (6) 
where i represents the country; t is time; π is inflation; πsd is the GARCH measure of inflation 
variability, profit is profitability and ycit is cyclical income. The results of this are shown in 
Table 5 for each measure of profitability. 
 
The results are encouraging for the social conflict approach. First, the profit rate (either in 
manufacturing or business) is always significant. The profit share performs less well. The level 
of inflation is also significant and negative, consistent with both the social conflict approach and 
that of Ball, Mankiw and Romer. However, the variability of inflation and the cyclical position 
of the economy are less strongly associated with the effectiveness of aggregate demand. 
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Second, although both profits and the level of inflation are significant, the effect of profits is 
almost double that of inflation. This is shown by calculating the effect of a given percentage 
change in profits, inflation, etc on the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies, the so-called 
elasticities. In Table 6 we present the elasticities which we calculate at the means of the 
variables concerned38. Thus, for the net profit rate in business, a 10% increase in the profit rate 
(say from 10% to 11%) is associated with a 2.8% increase in the effectiveness of aggregate 
demand policies. By contrast, a 10% increase in inflation is associated only with a 1.4% 
increase. In other words, the relationship between profits and the effectiveness of aggregate 
demand policies is stronger than that of the level of inflation and τ. Elasticities do not take into 
account the standard deviation of a variable and hence likely changes in the variables 
concerned. Thus, whilst a 10% increase in inflation may be very common, a 10% increase in 
profitability may be rarer. In order to confirm that our results are not sensitive to this criticism, 
we also calculate the impact of a 1 standard deviation increase in variable concerned on 
effectiveness of aggregate demand policies. The results confirm our conclusion that the profit 
association appears stronger. 
 
Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) provide two further extensions to their results which are worth 
exploring here to determine whether our conclusions about the importance of profits are 
unaffected. First, they allow for nonlinearities by including mean inflation squared for each 
country in their cross-sectional regressions. Second, they include aggregate demand growth 
variability (the standard deviation of nominal GDP growth). As we argued above, their theory 
predicts a negative relationship between the variability of aggregate demand and the 
effectiveness of demand management39. 
 
Including both nominal aggregate demand variability and allowing for nonlinearities in our 
fixed-effects regression produces the results given in Tables 7 and 8. We restrict ourselves to 
results for the profit rates (in manufacturing and business) and we use the centred moving 
standard deviation of nominal GDP growth as a measure of the variability of aggregate demand. 
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The results are similar in that profits are significant, although the effect of inflation on the 
effectiveness of aggregate demand policies is weaker (since only the squared value of inflation 
is significant in each of the equations). 
 
The total impact of inflation and aggregate demand variability on τ is given by the coefficients 
on both the level and the squared terms for each variable. The results suggest that in both cases 
the relationship is bell-shaped (the coefficient on the squared term is negative). That is, initially 
inflation is positively related to τ and then becomes negatively related (and similarly for the 
variability of aggregate demand). Comparing the maximum point of the bell-shaped relationship 
with the data range of each of the two variables in our sample, we can conclude the following. 
First, for inflation, our data suggests a negative relationship between τ and inflation (that is, we 
are always on the downward sloping part of the bell shape), although as we noted above the 
effect is less significant. Second, the relationship between τ and aggregate demand variability is 
negative at low levels of aggregate demand variability and positive at higher levels; the range of 
our data includes both the upward and downward sloping parts of the bell-shaped relationship. 
Thus overall, the effect relationship between τ and aggregate demand variability is not 
unambiguously negative as predicted by the theories of Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) and 
Lucas (1973)40. 
  
More importantly, for our purposes, the elasticities and the effect of a 1 standard deviation 
increase in the variable concerned (reported in Table 8) indicate that the relationship between 
inflation and aggregate demand effectiveness is weaker than that between profits and τ. The 
elasticity of aggregate demand variability is small and, at the mean, it is positive (not the sign 
expected by the theory). Finally, the elasticity of cyclical income is now negative as predicted 
by theory, but is a long way from being significant. 
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V. Conclusions 
 
This paper has shown that profits are positively related to the effectiveness of aggregate demand 
policies or, equivalently, negatively related to the slope of the Phillips curve. This result holds 
both across countries and through time. Moreover, the relationship between profits and the 
effectiveness of aggregate demand policies is stronger than the relationships predicted by the 
three other competing accounts: a traditional Keynesian view; the New Classical school; and the 
New Keynesian school. 
 
Our interpretation of these results is that the importance of profits reflects the importance of 
social conflict in explaining the effectiveness of aggregate demand policies. Both across time 
and countries, the argument of this paper is that it is difficult to understand macroeconomic 
developments and policies without at least some reference to how economies accommodate the 
existence of social conflict. The corollary of the above is that, to the extent that one of the pillars 
of he golden age was effective aggregate demand policies, our results suggest that a necessary, 
if not sufficient, condition for restoring such effectiveness is an institutional framework that 
addresses the problem of social conflict. 
 
                                                          
Endnotes 
 
1 On the rise and fall of the golden age, see Marglin and Schor (1990). 
2 For more on the relationship between different views about the stability of the market 
economy and how this relates to attitudes about inflation see Hirsch (1978). 
3 See, for instance, Aglietta (1976) and Glyn et al (1990). 
4 On the role of inflation in ‘reflecting and also mediating political struggles’ see Hirsch (1978, 
pp.269-270) and Crouch (1978). For Hirsch (1978, pp.276-278) inflation is often the result of 
groups in society opposing other solutions in the face of rising social conflict. For instance, the 
latter may entail further interference with the market economy along neo-corporatist grounds 
and as such be seen ‘as threats to the economic and perhaps also political status quo’ (Hirsch, 
1978, p.279; see also Goldthorpe, 1987). Moreover eventually the disruptive effects of inflation 
help to build a coalition which can impose stabilisation even if this is associated with important 
losses for certain sectors of society. Political scientists have done much to elucidate pro and 
anti-inflation coalitions (see Maier, 1978). 
5 For a classical analysis along these lines explaining Latin American inflation, see Hirschman 
(1985). On the phenomenon of leapfrogging, see Hirsch (1978, p.211) and Soskice (2000). 
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6 This is drawn partly from two volumes on the issue, Goldthorpe and Hirsch (1978) and 
Lindberg and Maier (1985). A similar story, with rather different terminology, can be found in 
Armstrong et al (1987), Glyn et al (1990). 
7 The Regulation school has emphasised how macroeconomic policy to ensure enough demand, 
and labour relations that allowed real wage growth but not enough to eat into profits was tied to 
the prevailing mode of ‘Fordist’ production. See Aglietta (1976) and Glyn et al (1990). 
8 Although the deterioration of key macroeconomic variables was in evidence before 1974, that 
is before the first oil shock (see for instance Glyn et al, p.72). 
9 For this debate on corporatism see Crouch (1985), Goldthorpe (1984), Pekkarinen et al (1992) 
and Henley and Tsakalotos (1993). 
10 See Green et al (1992). 
11 This can also be captured in the language of the economist since marketisation is associated 
with increased individualism and thus with a decreased provision of public goods (Hirsch, 1978, 
p.274). 
12 As the above makes clear, the question of social conflict was not just about wages. The 
Regulation school has been most prominent in stressing that from the 1960s onwards there were 
increasing ‘micro-conflicts’ within the production process itself putting into question work 
routines, the separation between those organise work process and those who actually carry them 
out and so on. See, for instance, Lipietz (1992, p.15) and Armstrong et al (1987). 
13 While in this paper we emphasise conflict within the national context, most of the analysts 
from the traditions being discussed, are acutely aware of the importance of conflict between 
nations, most notably, but far from exclusively, associated with the two major oil shocks and the 
commodity price boom in general. 
14 See Hirsch (1978), Goldthorpe (1978; 1987) and Lindberg (1985, p.31). 
15 Again as Hirsch argues (1978, pp.280-281) one does not have to appeal to any irrationality on 
the part of organised labour with respect to its attempts to organise collectively in some sense 
against the market. This is the case even if empirically it could be shown that such action has 
not led to an increase of the real wage. For the benefits of such actions need to be also seen in 
terms of the power of labour in the political and production arenas, as well as in the distribution 
of income affecting certain sectors of labour. 
16 See also Armstrong et al (1987 ch. 17 and p.322). 
17 For many the expectation was that the market solution would lead to difficulties since, at least 
in the short run, it entailed a disproportionate burden (through unemployment, lower incomes 
and so on) on the weakest groups in the economy and thus was incompatible with both the 
‘democratic ethic’, ‘sense of fairness’ and the rise of ‘social citizenship’ which had become 
prevalent in the post-war period in many economies (see Lindberg, 1985, pp.40 & 45; 
Goldthorpe, 1978).  
18 The predictive power of the model of social conflict we are discussing is evident from 
Hirsch’s (1978, p.276) argument made in the 1970s that ‘the containment of the latent 
distributional struggle without financial instability requires either sufficient authority, or 
sufficient consensus, on the values or principles underlying the distribution of income and other 
aspects of welfare’. See also Maier and Lindberg (1985, p.578). 
19 Although Maier and Lindberg do not put it in such terms the centrality of profits is clearly 
implicit in their analysis throughout. And of course this is explicitly so when, as we have seen 
they link the market solution to the ‘buttressing’ of profits. It is also quite explicit when they 
discuss developments in neo-corporatism at the time in Sweden on the lines of the unions’ 
support for wage-earner funds (Maier and Lindberg, 1985, p.597). For such schemes imply 
exactly the socialisation of investment and cutting the umbilical cord between investment and 
private profitability. For an analysis of wage-earner funds in this context see Pontusson (1992)  
20 This line of argument can be found in any basic intermediate macroeconomics textbook and is 
usually represented by a flat or upward sloping aggregate supply curve which becomes vertical 
at full employment. 
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21 We are working here with an imperfectly competitive model which allows firms to act as 
price setters rather than price takers in their particular markets. Note also that firms in this 
model are not profit maximisers. 
22 Scitovsky (1978) provides a similar explanation for inflation. In his model inflation results 
from an imbalance of power between labour and product markets which generates conflict over 
income distribution. If both labour and product markets were competitive, then the question of 
power would not arise and wages and prices would be determined by supply and demand 
conditions alone. If, however, we have imperfect competition and if power is imbalanced (for 
example, workers have some power in the labour market and producers have power in the 
product market), then such imbalances can, according to Scitovsky, lead to inflation. The extent 
of producer power in Scitovsky’s model depends on market structure (or the degree of 
concentration) and the price elasticity of demand for different products.  
23 In fact, Lucas estimates something a little different from equation (1) in that he takes 
deviations of output from trend. 
24 Estimation of equation (1) has been criticised as including demand shocks (represented by the 
change in nominal output, ∆x) but not supply shocks. Movements in real output is any economy 
is dependent on both types of shocks and if they are correlated then the omission of the former 
could bias the coefficient on the latter. As Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) argue, if policy 
makers offset the impact of supply shocks on nominal GDP by fiscal and/or monetary policy 
changes, then the correlation of demand and supply shocks will not influence the estimation of 
τ. Moreover, equation (1) will not generate biased estimates of τ if the aggregate demand 
schedule is unit elastic. In this case any supply shock will result in an equiproportional 
movement in prices and output in opposite directions, leaving nominal GDP unchanged with the 
result that changes in nominal GDP reflect only demand shocks and not supply shocks. In order 
to determine the sensitivity of their results to different elasticities, Ball, Mankiw and Romer 
estimate a variant of equation (1) which we discuss below. 
25 In order to check that our data produces similar results for the periods used by Lucas (1973) 
and Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988), we replicated their estimates of τ for as close to their 
periods as our data would allow. The results are very similar and hence we confident that the 
conclusions we draw below are not based on differences in data. 
26 This has the advantage that the dependent variable is integrated of order zero (I((0)) and, as 
Appendix II shows, ∆lnxt is usually I(0) as well. This prevents us from drawing spurious 
conclusions simply because y and x are trended. Equation 1a can be interpreted as containing a 
long run where real output is trended. 
27 We start with an estimated τ which comes from an equation with 10 observations. In other 
words, our first estimate of τ comes from an equation with more observations than are actually 
needed to estimate τ, in order to eliminate any instability in the τ estimate arising from rather 
few observations. We then successively add years to generate a series of τ for each country. 
28 The inclusion in equation 1a of a dummy variable for the oil shocks of 1973-74, 1979-80, 
1986 (oil price fall) and 1990-91, representing the most important supply shocks over the period 
does not alter the measure of τ significantly. In all cases except the US, the dummy is 
insignificantly different from zero. 
29 We test for structural breaks in a variety of years around potential breaks. Here we quote the F 
test with the highest value around the date of a structural break. 
30 As Glyn (1997) notes, neoclassical theory tends to downplay the variability of profitability 
and profit shares and hence its ability to play a significant macroeconomic role. The data on 
profitability and profit shares used here shows that there have been significant variations over 
the period considered. 
31 Cyclical income measures departures of output from some measure of potential output. 
Capacity utilisation refers to the degree to which the capital stock is used. For some EU 
countries data on capacity utilisation is available from 1984 or later (European Economy 
Supplement B). Correlations between these series and our measure of deviations of output from 
trend are high (with the exception of Germany), suggesting that our measure of cyclical income 
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is a good proxy for capacity utilisation. We measure trend output here using the Hodrick-
Prescott filter. 
32 A fixed effects regression has the advantage that we control for factors which are country 
specific and do not change over  time (or change only slowly). Such factors may influence the 
effectiveness of aggregate demand policies. An obvious example is a country’s openness to 
foreign trade. Some have argued that more open economies tend to have lower inflation since in 
such economies there is a smaller trade-off between unemployment and inflation (the Phillips 
curve is steeper) and hence aggregate demand policies are less effective at changing output – 
they simply affect prices and inflation. Evidence supporting this is given by Romer (1993) and 
Lane (1997) who examine the relationship between average levels of openness and inflation in a 
number of countries, both developing and industrialised. Openness in these models is not 
something that explains cycles in inflation, but rather differences in long-run inflation rates 
across countries, the fixed effects in our equation will capture any possible influence of 
openness of aggregate demand policy effectiveness. Another factor which might affect policy 
effectiveness is labour market institutions which again tend to be fairly fixed over time but 
differ significantly between the countries in our sample. Thus the fixed effects regression has a 
distinct advantage that such factors are accounted for implicitly in our estimation. 
33 ARCH (Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) and GARCH (Generalised 
Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) models  focus on estimation of the variance of a 
data series, modelling it as a function of past values of the variance and any exogenous variables 
which might be relevant to its determination. We compute the order of ARCH and GARCH 
terms in the variance equation based on tests for restricting higher order terms to have a 
coefficient of zero as well as on the basis of the value of the log likelihood ratio. 
34 The coefficient of 1.41 is very close to that of Ball, Mankiw and Romer whose cross-section 
regression yields a coefficient of 1.35 (see their equation 5.1 in Table 5 of their paper). 
35 For the purposes of comparison with Ball, Mankiw and Romer, we also ran the regression up 
to 1986. The results qualitatively similar with the coefficient on profits being slightly higher 
over the shorter period. Results are available from the author on request. 
36 This is also true for the results in equations (2) to (4) above. 
37 The results presented here and later are unaffected by our use of the GARCH measure of 
inflation variability. Results with the moving standard deviation of inflation are available from 
the author on request. 
38 Given an equation y = α + βx, the elasticity of y with respect to x is given by 
(dy/dx)(xmean/ymean) where dy/dx is equal to β. 
39 A further extension relates to the possible bias from the omission of supply shocks from 
equations (1) and (1a). This might be important if the aggregate demand schedule is not unit 
elastic as we noted above. Investigation of this along the lines outlined in Ball, Mankiw and 
Romer (1988, pp.46-7) does not alter the results except in the case that the elasticity of the 
aggregate demand schedule is very small which as Ball, Mankiw and Romer point out is 
unlikely. 
40 Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) in fact do not find a significant relationship between τ and 
aggregate demand variability. They investigate only a linear relationship in their equation and 
hence perhaps our finding of a nonlinear relationship can go some way to explain this result. 
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Table 1: Updating Lucas’ and Ball, Mankiw and Romer’s results 
country data period τ mean inflation variance of inflation 
AUS 1961-2000 0.382 0.056 0.039 
BE 1954-2000 0.658 0.037 0.028 
CA 1951-2000 0.495 0.041 0.032 
DK 1967-1999 0.519 0.059 0.035 
FN 1961-1999 0.488 0.060 0.041 
FR 1951-2000 0.017 0.053 0.043 
GE 1961-1999 0.701 0.031 0.018 
IT 1961-1999 0.073 0.075 0.052 
JA 1957-1998 0.569 0.043 0.039 
NL 1957-1999 0.912 0.039 0.026 
NW 1967-2000 0.017 0.058 0.032 
SW 1951-1999 0.138 0.055 0.035 
UK 1951-2000 0.039 0.059 0.045 
US 1951-2000 0.578 0.039 0.029 
Remaining country in our sample (for interest) 
NZ 1955-1999 0.252 0.064 0.049 
 
 
Table 2: Structural Break in equation (1) 
 date of test F-test probability 
Australia 1974 10.42 0.00 
Belgium 1 1974 2.06 0.06 
Canada 1974 2.79 0.04 
 1982 2.58 0.05 
Denmark 1984 4.33 0.01 
Finland 1976 4.59 0.00 
 1991 5.46 0.00 
France 1974 12.30 0.00 
Germany 1974 3.90 0.04 
Italy 1970 4.70 0.00 
Japan 1973 2.58 0.05 
New Zealand 1976 5.81 0.00 
Sweden 1975 11.75 0.00 
 1991 3.82 0.01 
UK 1974 6.43 0.00 
US 1970 4.34 0.00 
 1979 2.70 0.04 
Note: the Chow Breakpoint test is conducted on the whole sample, that is 1950-2000 or whatever 
period of data is available for each country. 
 
1 We also checked for a break in 1985, but it is not significant. 
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Table 3: Correlations between τ and profits, inflation and inflation variability 
Country correlation of τ with2: 
 nprm1 mprb1 npsm1 npsb1 inflation variability of 
inflation 
cyclical 
income 
AUS 0.54 0.68 0.68 0.84 -0.44 0.06 0.16 
BE -0.76 -0.16 -0.70 -0.19 0.16 -0.23 -0.01 
CA 0.09 -0.05 0.13 -0.11 -0.84 -0.35 -0.69 
DK 0.25 n.a. -0.72 -0.78 0.82 0.94 0.31 
FN -0.02 0.04 0.10 0.13 -0.69 -0.40 -0.40 
FR 0.43 0.85 0.08 0.77 -0.10 0.77 0.36 
GE -0.62 -0.68 -0.70 -0.63 -0.54 -0.12 -0.55 
IT 0.42 -0.11 0.47 0.49 -0.41 -0.32 -0.85 
JA 0.80 0.85 0.75 0.78 0.09 0.24 0.28 
NL n.a. n.a. -0.43 0.06 0.02 0.34 0.47 
NZ n.a. n.a. -0.29 -0.26 -0.23 -0.22 -0.01 
NW 0.33 0.35 0.54 0.45 -0.78 -0.84 -0.59 
SW 0.30 n.a. 0.26 n.a. -0.63 -0.05 -0.04 
UK 0.73 0.56 0.80 0.15 -0.35 -0.38 0.25 
US 0.55 0.43 0.10 0.56 -0.01 0.01 -0.07 
        
1 nprm is the net profit rate in manufacturing; nprb is the net profit rate in the business sector; npsm is 
the net profit share in manufacturing; npsb is the net profit share in business. 
2 the sample period varies according to the availability of data. 
 
 
Table 4: The effect of profits on τ: whole sample period  
 coefficient standard error t-statistic probability 
(a) net profit rate in manufacturing (n=348) 
constant 0.286 0.020 14.113 0.000 
Nprm 0.006 0.001 4.257 0.000 
fixed effects F(12,334) = 113.43 [prob=0.00] 
     
(b) net profit rate in the business sector (n=320) 
constant 0.253 0.022 11.433 0.000 
nprb 0.010 0.002 5.935 0.000 
fixed effects F(10, 308) = 189.53 [prob=0.00] 
     
(c) net profit share in manufacturing (n=411) 
constant 0.316 0.032 9.789 0.000 
npsm 0.004 0.001 2.651 0.008 
fixed effects F(14, 395) = 147.16 [prob=0.00] 
     
(d) net profit share in the business sector (n=382) 
constant 0.403 0.034 11.811 0.000 
npsb 0.001 0.001 0.856 0.856 
fixed effects F(13, 367) = 187.36 [prop=0.00] 
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Table 5: The determinants of tau – multivariate regression 
 coefficient standard error t-statistic probability 
(a) net profit rate in manufacturing (n = 348) 
inflation variability 0.427 0.696 0.61  0.540 
Inflation -0.855 0.225 -3.80 0.000 
profitability 0.005 0.002 3.01 0.003 
cyclical income -0.028 0.227 -0.12 0.903 
Constant 0.350 0.029 12.06 0.000 
Fixed effects F(12,331) = 113.1 [prob=0.00]   
    
     
(b) net profit rate in business (n = 320) 
inflation variability -0.548 0.647 -0.85 0.398 
Inflation -0.629 0.217 -2.90 0.004 
profitability 0.008 0.002 4.40 0.000 
cyclical income 0.020 0.205 0.10 0.922 
Constant 0.324 0.029 11.18 0.000 
Fixed effects F(10,305) = 156.5[prob=0.00]   
    
     
(c) net profit share in manufacturing (n = 411) 
inflation variability 0.992 0.694 1.43 0.153 
Inflation -0.526 0.228 -2.31 0.021 
profitability 0.002 0.001 1.52 0.128 
cyclical income 0.094 0.208 0.45 0.653 
Constant 0.357 0.047 7.67 0.000 
Fixed effects F(14,392) = 132.6[prob=0.00]   
    
     
(d) net profit share in business (n = 382) 
inflation variability 0.163 0.684 0.24 0.812 
Inflation -0.716 0.220 -3.25 0.001 
profitability -0.001 0.001 -0.86 0.388 
cyclical income 0.311 0.182 1.71 0.088 
Constant 0.504 0.046 10.97 0.000 
Fixed effects F(13,364) = 163.0[prob=0.00]   
    
     
Notes: fixed effects shows the joint significance of the individual country effects. 
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Table 6: Profitability elasticities based on equation results in Table 5 
Variable elasticity 1 standard 
deviation increase 
variability of inflation1 -0.026 to 0.047 -0.071 to 0.012 
inflation1 -0.144 to –0.082 -0.033 to –0.021 
cyclical income -0.001 to 0.004 -0.001 to 0.011 
net profit rate in manufacturing 0.177 0.031 
net profit rate in business 0.279 0.055 
net profit share in manufacturing 0.119 0.016 
net profit share in business -0.063 -0.009 
  
1 the range reflects the range over the various equations 
 
 
Table 7: The determinants of tau – multivariate regression 
 coefficient standard error t-statistic probability 
(a) net profit rate in manufacturing (n = 348) 
Inflation variability 0.468 0.694 0.67 0.501 
Inflation 0.388 0.601 0.64 0.520 
Inflation squared -8.109 3.272 -2.48 0.014 
profitability 0.005 0.002 3.34 0.001 
AD variability 3.314 1.535 2.16 0.032 
AD variability squared -42.557 24.041 -1.77 0.078 
cyclical income -0.198 0.244 -0.81 0.418 
Constant 0.271 0.038 7.07 0.000 
Fixed effects F(12,328) = 113.9 [prob=0.00]   
    
     
(b) net profit rate in business (n = 320) 
inflation variability -0.587 0.652 -0.90 0.369 
Inflation -0.040 0.524 -0.08 0.938 
inflation squared -4.113 2.779 -1.48 0.140 
profitability 0.008 0.002 4.51 0.000 
AD variability 2.985 1.339 2.23 0.027 
AD variability squared -42.575 20.503 -2.08 0.039 
cyclical income -0.055 0.220 -0.25 0.804 
Constant 0.278 0.035 8.05 0.000 
Fixed effects F(10,302 = 153.6[prob=0.00]   
    
     
     
Notes: fixed effects shows the joint significance of the individual country effects. 
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Table 8: Profitability elasticities based on equation results in Table 7 
Variable elasticity 1 standard 
deviation increase 
variability of inflation1 -0.028 to 0.025 -0.007 to 0.006 
inflation1 -0.104 to –0.084 -0.024 to –0.021 
variability of AD1 0.069 to 0.086 0.018 to 0.022 
cyclical income -0.004 to –0.001 -0.007 to –0.002 
net profit rate in manufacturing 0.177 0.031 
net profit rate in business 0.279 0.055 
  
1 the range reflects the range over the various equations 
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Figure 2: updating BMR results
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Figure 1: updating Lucas' results
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Figure 3: recursive tau measures for selected countries
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Figure 4: recursive tau measures for selected countries
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Figure 5: recursive tau measures for selected countries
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Figure 6: recursive tau measures for selected countries
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Appendix I: data availability and profits measures 
 Variable 
Country τ inflation nprm nprb npsm npsb  
AUS 65-00 51-00 67-95 70-95 67-95 70-95  
BE 58-00 51-00 70-90 70-95 70-90 70-95  
CA 55-00 51-00 52-92 52-92 52-92 52-92  
DK 71-99 51-00 70-81 n.a. 66-95 70-95  
FN 65-99 51-00 61-96 71-96 61-96 70-96  
FR 55-00 51-00 51-92 52-96 51-92 51-95  
GE 65-99 51-00 52-93 52-93 52-93 52-93  
IT 65-99 51-00 52-92 52-96 52-92 52-96  
JA 61-98 51-00 60-95 52-96 60-95 52-87  
NL 61-99 51-00 n.a. n.a. 75-95 70-96  
NW 71-00 51-00 62-91 70-91 62-91 70-91  
NZ 59-99 51-00 n.a. n.a. 71-94 71-94  
SW 55-99 51-00 63-93 n.a. 60-94 n.a.  
UK 55-00 51-00 52-95 52-95 52-95 52-95  
US 55-00 51-00 52-93 50-97 52-93 50-97  
Note: the τ requires nominal GDP and real GDP and is usually missing in the early part of the period 
because there is no real GDP data. 
 
Profit measures 
 
We confine ourselves in this appendix to outlining the principles used in calculating profit rates and profit 
shares. Excel data files for individual countries are available from the author on request. In general, we 
follow the methodology used by Armstrong et al (1987) and Glyn (1997). That is, where available we use 
the figures in the OECD National Accounts, Table 14. This is what Glyn (1997) does and we update his 
figures from later OECD National Accounts volumes where possible. Table 14 was published by the 
OECD for selected countries from x to y (with statistics going back to z in many cases). In order to extend 
the series back to 1970 or where the statistics were not reported in Table 14, we used where possible data 
on the cost components of GDP from Table 13 (which include gross value added, depreciation, gross 
operating surplus and wages). The figures for manufacturing (taken either from Table 14 or calculated 
from Table 13) are adjusted for self-employment in the following manner. From Table 15 of the OECD 
National Accounts, we calculate self-employment in manufacturing as the difference between all persons 
in manufacturing and employees in manufacturing. From Table 13, we have wage costs in manufacturing 
which along with the number of employees in manufacturing generates an average wage. We then assume 
that this average wage applies to the self-employed, thus generating a wage cost for the self-employed 
which we subtract from the gross operating surplus. This approach thus goes some way for correcting for 
the fact that national accounts figures do not impute a wage to the self-employed and thus overestimate 
profit rates or shares. For the business sector, this problem does not exist since it is defined as the 
corporate or quasi-corporate enterprises and does not include the self-employed. In order to extend the 
series further to cover the 1950s and 1960s, we link in our data with that of Armstrong et al (1987) who 
provide figures from the early 1950s for a number of the countries we examine here and Glyn (1997) who  
as figures from the 1960s for manufacturing. 
Appendix II: Unit root tests 
 
 Variable 
Country  
lnvgdp 
 
dlnvgdp 
 
dlngdp 
 
tau 
 
inflation 
 
moving 
SD 
inflation 
 
GARCH 
inflation 
 
nprb 
 
nprm 
 
npsb 
 
npsm 
 
AD 
variability 
 
capacity 
utilisation 
Australia -3.20+ -4.15* -3.09 -3.06** -2.13** -4.84** -4.55** -3.11** -2.41* -2.69** -2.53* -3.98** -2.39* 
Belgium -1.03 -3.24+ -2.27 -2.32* -2.36* -2.45* -2.18* -3.97** -0.69 -3.36** 0.49 -2.77* -2.27* 
Canada -1.24 -5.26** -3.39* -2.18* -2.10* -3.82** -3.13** -3.31** -4.19** -3.57** -3.54** -4.24** -3.23** 
Denmark -3.66* -4.01* -2.83 -2.99** -1.73+ -2.32* -3.10** n.a. -3.06** -1.24 -0.90 -3.37** -2.95** 
Finland -2.19 -4.07* -3.94* -4.24** -2.03* -1.94+ -1.61 -3.64** -4.71** -3.20** -3.26** -3.02** -4.03** 
France -0.64 -3.60* -2.97 -1.72+ -1.72+ -3.88** -2.36* -2.22* -2.19* -2.17* -1.80+ -5.18** -2.46* 
Germany -2.66 -4.75** -4.38** -2.98** -2.36* -3.94** -4.62** -1.73+ -1.65+ -1.73+ -1.18 -2.31* -2.47* 
Italy -1.58 -4.89** -2.46 -2.24* -1.71+ -3.38** -3.88** -2.44* -2.07* -1.29 -1.82+ -3.50** -1.98* 
Japan -0.87 -4.53** -4.13* -1.94+ -1.95* -2.04* -2.48* -2.13* -1.69+ -1.88+ -2.07* -2.73** -1.97* 
Netherlands -1.32 -4.33** -1.54 -0.46 -2.04* -3.02** -1.38 n.a. n.a. -2.55* -1.14 -4.66** -1.86+ 
Norway -1.64 -3.33+ -3.68* -1.78+ -1.67+_ -1.76+ 0.26 3.13** -3.51** -3.45** -3.09** -2.96** -2.84** 
New Zealand -1.82 -4.41** -2.43 -3.51** -1.27 -2.43* -2.24* n.a. n.a. -0.61 -1.07 -2.87** -2.28* 
Sweden -1.31 -4.92** -4.19** -2.52* -1.73+ -4.24** -2.57* n.a. -3.06** n.a. -2.72** -2.66** -3.17** 
UK -2.81 -5.84** -1.34 -2.13* -2.11* -2.05* -3.80** -2.27* -2.23* -2.70** -2.35* -3.48** -3.71** 
US -2.25 -5.00** -3.22+ -2.59* -3.02** -2.40* -3.91** -1.82+ -1.68+ -2.00* -2.27* -2.30* -3.93** 
We test for a unit root in the level of the variable; a significant t-statistic represents rejection of a unit root in favour of stationarity. 
** significant at 1%; * significant at 5%;  + significant at 10%. 
 
Where lnvgdp is the log of real GDP; dlnvgdp is the first difference of the log of GDP; dlngdp is the first difference of the log of nominal GDP; 
nprb is the net profit rate in business; nprm is the net profit rate in manufacturing; npsb is the net profit share in business; npsm is the net profit 
share in manufacturing. 
 
lnvgdp, dlnvgdp and dlngdp appear in equation (1a); the unit root tests include a constant and trend. The unit root tests for tau and the variables in 
the tau equations are conducted on the variable minus the country mean for that variable (so as to match the variables used in the fixed effects 
panel equation). 
